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Abstract 
It is widely affirmed that human beings have irreplaceable valuable, and that we owe it to 
them to treat them accordingly.  Many theorists have been drawn to Kantianism because 
they think that it alone can capture this intuition.  One aim of this paper is to show that 
this is a mistake, and that Kantianism cannot provide an independent rational vindication, 
nor even a fully illuminating articulation, of irreplaceability.  A further aim is to outline a 
broadly Aristotelian view that provides a more fitting theoretical framework for this 
appealing conception of human value.  This critique of Kantianism extends to 
contemporary theorists with a broadly Kantian orientation, including Christine Korsgaard, 
Stephen Darwall and John Rawls.  The problem with these views, at heart, is that they 
attempt to ground morality in respect alone.  Yet it is love, not respect, that brings 
irreplaceability into view.  The paper closes with a sketch of a virtue-theoretic theory that 
follows Aquinas in taking love to be a master virtue that refines the other virtues so as to 
ensure a continuous and practically efficacious sensitivity to the irreplaceable value of 
fellow human beings. 
Keywords: Acknowledging, irreplaceable value, Kantianism.    
                                                          
1. This essay appeared previously in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 8, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018), 9-31.  It has been presented to audiences at the University of Arizona, the 
University of Toronto, the University of Chicago, and Auburn University, and the author thanks these audiences 
for their helpful responses and suggestions. 
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Introduction 
I take it as a starting point that human beings have a distinctive kind of value, 
not just much greater than but also formally different from the value of, say, a 
pleasurable sensation or a pocket full of money. It can make perfect sense to 
invest one hundred dollars in order to secure two hundred, or to forgo one 
welcome sensation in order to experience another, more pleasurable one. 
When we make such trade-offs, we don’t ordinarily lament the particular 
dollars or pleasures we have forgone, because the loss has been compensated 
in kind. The loss of a human being is not similarly compensable by the creation 
or preservation of another human life. This is not to say that it could never 
make sense to choose a course of action that will foreseeably lead to the death 
of one person because it will spare the lives of many others. It is only to deny 
that in the wake of such a choice, it would make sense to regard the lost life as 
compensated for by the lives that have been spared. What rules out such 
compensation is that each human being has irreplaceable value. Any viable 
account of the value of human beings, and in turn any viable ethical theory, 
must affirm their irreplaceability in this special sense. 
Any such account must also make sense of the standing of human beings as 
beings who can properly claim certain forms of regard and treatment as their due. It 
must make sense, that is, of the essentially interpersonal structure of certain ethical 
demands. For it is true of human beings not only that they ought to be treated as 
bearers of irreplaceable value, but that they are due such treatment. If we did not so 
treat them, we would not merely do the wrong thing; we would wrong them. 
It is often alleged that a broadly Aristotelian approach to ethics cannot properly 
accommodate either of these features of the value of human beings. Some think it 
has special difficulty acknowledging the value of those whose natural attributes, 
upbringing, or afflictions put virtuous character beyond their reach. Others think 
the eudaimonistic structure of Aristotelianism presents a more general 
impediment to the acknowledgment of others as self-standing sources of reasons. 
The thought is that if all practical reasons are grounded ultimately in the reasoner’s 
own flourishing, then it can never be a fundamental reason for any action that we 
owe it to another to do it. Those who raise such concerns often suggest that a 
broadly Kantian approach to ethics can provide a more illuminating account of the 
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obligation to treat each human being as irreplaceably valuable, and of the standing 
of each human being to demand such treatment as her due. 
I will suggest that these charges should be reversed. In saying this, I don’t mean 
to deny that a commitment to irreplaceability is woven into the substantive ethical 
commitments associated with Kantianism. It obviously is. Indeed, Kantianism 
owes much of its intuitive appeal to its affirmation of the irreplaceable value of 
human beings. I believe, however, that Kantianism cannot succeed in its ambition 
to provide an independent rational vindication, or even a fully illuminating 
articulation, of this picture of human value. My aim is to explain what has led me 
to this conclusion, and to offer some speculations on how a revisionist Aristotelian 
approach might provide a more fitting theoretical framework for (though not an 
independent derivation of) this appealing conception of human value. 
I. Kantianism and Irreplaceable Value 
Kant distinguishes between two kinds of value-bearers: those with a mere price 
and those with a dignity. “Whatever has a price,” he explains, “can be replaced by 
something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price, 
and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity” (Kant, 1997, 4: 434). It is 
central to Kant’s substantive ethical view that every human being has a dignity, 
hence cannot “be replaced by something else as its equivalent.”  
This substantive ethical conviction can be found in a wide array of 
contemporary views that are often categorized as Kantian. Indeed, Kantianism’s 
ringing affirmation of this view goes a long way towards explaining the turn to Kant 
ethics among late 20th and early 21st Century ethical theorists, many of whom were 
appalled by utilitarianism’s readiness to aggregate costs and benefits across 
persons, even at the cost of life, liberty and limb. One particularly influential version 
of this affirmation is due to John Rawls, who states at the outset of A Theory of 
Justice that, “Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even 
the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that 
the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others” 
(Rawls, 1971, pp. 3-4). Rawls goes on to claim that utilitarianism’s failure to affirm 
this intuitive truth shows that it “does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons” (Rawls, 1971, p. 27). 
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Now, this passage from Rawls puts forward the irreplaceable value of human 
beings in an attempt to “express our intuitive conviction in the primacy of justice” 
(Rawls, 1971, p. 4). Kant himself is widely thought to have put the view forward not 
merely as an evaluative intuition but as an implicit presupposition of any exercise 
of rational agency. One of Kant’s key arguments for this view, at least on Christine 
Korsgaard’s influential reading, is found in Groundwork II, just before the 
introduction of the version of the Categorical Imperative known as the Formula of 
Humanity. Korsgaard sees in this stretch of text an argument that can be 
summarized as follows: We cannot act except under the supposition that our 
chosen ends are good, and we can sustain this supposition on full reflection only if 
we regard our own will as an unconditioned source of value, capable of conferring 
conditional value on the (permissible) ends that it adopts for itself. Yet our will can 
be an unconditional source of value only if it is itself unconditionally valuable. So 
we must attribute unconditional value to our own capacity for rational choice, and 
must in all consistency attribute the same value to that same capacity wherever we 
find it. We must, then, regard rational nature wherever it occurs as unconditionally 
valuable, which is to say, as an end in itself (Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 119-123). 
If this is Kant’s argument, I don’t think it succeeds. In the first instance, I do not 
think that the goodness of our ends can be grounded in the very fact that we have 
willed them. If any permissible life plan could be given all of the value that a merely 
permissible life plan can have simply by choosing to pursue it, this would call into 
question the widespread conviction that it matters greatly whether we get such 
choices right, and that we can go badly wrong in ways that are morally blameless. 
Further, it would threaten the very idea of a genuine reason to pursue one 
(permissible but not required) life plan rather than another. If such plans owed their 
value entirely to our choice, their value would not differ from other possible plans 
before the choice that confers value upon them. This means that no genuine value 
could guide such choices, hence that there could be no good reason to make one 
choice rather than another. But if we were fully aware of this, we could not succeed 
in making such a choice in the first place, since (at least by Kantian lights) the will is 
nothing but practical reason, and cannot operate without implicitly taking something 
to be a reason. So we seem to need will-independent non-moral value as a condition 
for the possibility of clear-headed choice among merely permissible ends. 
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Even if we could resolve this thorny problem (e.g. by invoking as a viable reason 
for choice our need for some life plan or another, precisely in order to have 
reasons2), the doctrine under discussion would call into question the urgency of our 
objection to those infringements of freedom that close off our actual life pursuits, 
provided that these restrictions leave us with some viable alternative life plan, since 
we could confer upon the remaining alternative all the (non-moral) value that a life 
plan can have simply by choosing to pursue it. The objection to infringements of 
liberty would seem rather trivial if the harm imposed by the infringement could 
really be eliminated at will. So there is a conceptual tension between the stringent 
affirmation of individual freedom associated with Kantianism and the thesis that 
all value is conferred by the will. 
Suppose that these worries could somehow be overcome, and that it were 
established that that the goodness of our ends is conferred upon them by the fact 
that we’ve chosen them. Would this show the rational will itself to have 
irreplaceable value? I believe not. It might perhaps show that a rational agent’s 
value cannot coherently be transgressed in the name of some end whose value has 
been conferred by the choice of a rational agent. (I say only that it might, as this 
inference would depend upon a contestable conception of the dynamics of value-
conferral.) But it would not, in addition, settle the question how rational agents 
stand with respect to each other, and for instance whether the value of the 
continued life of one can be overridden in the name of the continued lives of two 
others. That is, it would not show rational nature to have what Kant calls a dignity 
rather than a somewhat complicated price. It would not show this because a value 
that has no conditions might still be outweighed, for purposes of practical 
deliberation, by more instances of the same sort of value. We see this, for instance, 
in familiar hedonistic versions of utilitarianism. Such theories assign value to each 
and every pleasure. They assert that there is no condition that must be met in order 
for a pleasure to have value. And yet no one thinks that these theories land in 
straightforward self-contradiction when they go on to deny the irreplaceable value 
of these pleasures (and, more pointedly, of the human beings in whom these 
pleasures occur). What the Kantian gets right is the substantive insistence that this 
                                                          
2. Korsgaard has put forward this option in her own attempts to articulate a broadly Kantian ethical 
theory (See Korsgaard, 1996b, Lecture 3). 
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sort of moral arithmetic is out of place when it comes to the value of human life and 
liberty. But such arithmetic appears to be entirely consistent with the recognition 
of unconditional value. What it cannot compass is irreplaceable value. 
Could we work up a variation of the above-sketched argument that would 
provide a transcendental ground for irreplaceable rather than merely 
unconditional value? One option would go by way of our encounter, in practical 
thought, with our own projects and commitments. We seem to need some project 
or commitment in order to bring practical deliberation to a successful conclusion, 
and any such project or commitment will involve a concern not just for future 
events but for our own future actions. After all, no one else can jump in for us and 
perform our future actions, completing our projects and commitments. Thus our 
projects and commitments might be thought to provide a transcendental practical 
ground for assigning irreplaceable importance to ourselves. And since each of us 
can see that all other rational agents have equally compelling grounds for assigning 
such value to themselves, we might argue along familiar Kantian lines that each of 
us must assign irreplaceable value to every rational agent. 
I don’t think this line of reasoning gets us to the intended quarry. The problem 
is not limited to the last step, where we are asked to leap from a claim about how 
all rational agents must see themselves to a conclusion about how each of us must 
see all of them. There are already difficulties in the prior, purely first-personal 
stretch of the argument. I accept the claim that I am indispensable to the 
completion of my projects, as you are to yours, and that projects must extend into 
the future if they are to be sources of practical direction. But, as Williams points out 
in his reflections on the opera The Makropulos Case, the mere possession of a 
project need not involve acknowledgment of any reason at all to stay around to 
complete it (Williams, 1973, pp. 82-100). I can coherently prefer to do A rather than 
B tomorrow if I happen to be around to do something, while being indifferent 
between doing A tomorrow and not being around to do anything at all. As far as I 
can see, there is no practical incoherence in having only projects that fall into this 
purely conditional category. It would be tragic to lack any project that animates the 
continuation of existence with purpose and meaning. But I do not think that having 
projects of this worthy sort is a necessary condition for bringing episodes of 
practical deliberation to a determinate conclusion. 
97   The Journal of Ethical Reflections, 1 (4), Winter 2020-2021 
 
 
The term in Kant’s lexicon that comes closest in meaning to my term 
‘irreplaceability’ is ‘dignity’. As we’ve seen, Kant introduces the notion by 
distinguishing that which has a dignity from that which has a mere price and hence 
can be “replaced by something else as its equivalent” (Kant, 1997, 4: 434). 
Interestingly, he seems to tie the dignity of the human being not to our will 
considered in its generic end-setting capacity but rather to our will in its capacity as 
the source of the moral law, hence in its capacity for autonomy. As he explains: 
Man in the system of nature (homo phaenomenon, animal rationale) 
is a being of little significance and, along with other animals, 
considered as products of the earth, has an ordinary value (pretium 
vulgare). Even the fact that he excels these in understanding and can 
set up ends for himself still gives him only an external value for his 
usefulness (praetium usus), namely, the value of a man in preference 
to another animal. This is to say that he has a price as a commodity in 
the exchange of these animals as things. . . But man as a person, i.e. as 
the subject of a morally-practical reason, is exalted above all price. For 
as such a one (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a 
means to he ends of other people, or even to his own ends, but is to be 
prized as an end in himself. This is to say, he possesses a 
dignity…(Kant, 2017, 6: 434-5). 
Here Kant tells us rather directly that we ought not to look for his vindication 
of our status as irreplaceably valuable in his discussion of the will considered simply 
as a capacity to set and pursue ends. His view seems to be that we have a dignity, 
and are to be treated as ends in ourselves, only because we are each “the subject of 
a possible absolutely good will” (G 4: 437) – that is, only because we are capable of 
acting from recognition of the authority of the moral law arising from the structure 
of our own will. Yet here too it is not clear why exactly this capacity for moral 
goodness implies that we possess irreplaceable value. This status seems to enter the 
picture as part of the substantive content of the moral law, and it is not clear how 
the status could possibly be grounded in the very idea of a self-legislative capacity. 
I will argue in Section II that it cannot be. 
Of course, the Kantian could simply stipulate that achtung involves an intuitive 
apprehension of the irreplaceable value associated with the capacity for freedom 
understood as self-legislation, and that achtung so understood, along with the 
irreplaceability that it brings into view, serve as fixed limitations on the task of 
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formulating acceptable moral principles. This would, I think, be a step in the right 
direction, since I think this conception of human value is extremely appealing, and 
I do not think we can provide a constructivist grounding for it. Yet a further 
problem would remain. The problem is that the phrases ‘rational nature’ and 
‘practical reasoner’ seem ill-suited to the task of bringing irreplaceability into view, 
and ‘respect’ seems an inapt name for the subjective acknowledgment of this 
irreplaceability. While I lack an ear for German, I think the same worry extends to 
the term ‘achtung,’ given that in many contexts it can be translated with the English 
term ‘warning,’ and this connotation seems discordant with our clearest 
apprehensions of the irreplaceable value of, say, a human infant or a badly 
wounded and therefore physically vulnerable adult. It seems to me, then, that 
Kantianism has trouble making full sense of the irreplaceable value of human 
beings not just because of the difficulties in providing a rational grounding of the 
value but also because the theory is cast in the wrong conceptual key to give apt 
expression to the value. I’ll say more about this difficulty in Section III below.  
II. Neo-Kantianism and Irreplaceable Value 
I’ve suggested that Kant’s theory does not make full sense of the picture of 
human value that accounts in large part for the appeal of the theory’s 
substantive moral principles. Yet it is one thing to speak of the limitations of 
Kant’s view, and quite another to speak of the limitations of Kantianism taken 
in the wide sense, as a family of views. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
consider every view that might be grouped within this family, but I do want to 
consider one common neo-Kantian approach to ethics. I have in mind the 
contractualist strategy, which is to say, the strategy that focuses not on the task 
of the isolated practical reasoner who must make sense of his own exercises of 
practical deliberation, but on the task of multiple reasoners concerned to 
justify their actions to one another in terms that each can accept (or can 
reasonably accept, or cannot reasonably reject, etc.). I do not think that we can 
provide an informative derivation of irreplaceability from the idea of each 
human as an equal moral legislator, or (to say the same thing in other words) 
an equal provider and demander of reasons. Any such argument would seem 
to require a substantive account of what is and is not an acceptable reason – 
an account, in particular, that would itself underwrite our status as 
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irreplaceable. The notions of reciprocal justificatory exchange, or equal 
legislative authority, would merely postpone rather than resolve the question 
of irreplaceability. 
This point can be sharpened by looking at Stephen Darwall’s case against 
utilitarianism. Darwall acknowledges that the utilitarian might accept what he, 
Darwall, says about the second-personal nature of moral reasons, then proceed to 
offer up utilitarianism as a substantive answer to the question what we can 
reasonably demand of each other (Darwall, 2009, p. 130). This is not a mere 
hypothetical possibility; it comes very close to describing the view of Derek Parfit, 
who argues that “Kantian Contractualism implies Rule Consequentialism” (Parfit, 
2011, p. 417). Supposing that this is a coherent form of argument, then one cannot 
settle the substantive confrontation between utilitarian and deontological moral 
theories merely by regarding morality as the reasonable outcome of the task of 
group self-legislation. One must adopt a particular understanding of the kind of 
value that human beings have – an understanding that goes beyond the mere 
insistence that we relate to each other as equal and unconditional sources of 
authoritative demands, and that settles such questions as whether human lives can 
legitimately be traded against one another in pursuit of utility-maximization. It is 
only after we settle a range of questions about the kind of value we have, including 
the question whether we have irreplaceable value, that we will be able to determine 
what we can legitimately demand of each other. 
A similar point can, I think, be made about Rawls’ argument for the inviolability 
of individual citizens. This result is not guaranteed by Rawls’ adoption of the 
original position as a device for constructing acceptable principles of justice. The 
parties to the original position consider utilitarian principles of justice. As Rawls 
sees it, they reject such principles because they favor the highly risk-averse decision 
procedure that he calls “maximin” – that is, the principle of maximizing the value 
of the worst possible outcome. Yet maximin is certainly no less controversial, and 
probably more controversial, than Rawls’ above-quoted intuitive affirmation of 
(what I am calling) the irreplaceable value of persons, and his associated 
denunciation of utilitarianism for riding roughshod over this irreplaceability. 
Indeed, the route to reflective equilibrium arguably runs from our confidence in the 
irreplaceable value (or inviolability) of human beings to whatever fine-tuning of the 
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original position will yield principles that express a commitment to it, not the other 
way round. 
Darwall’s theory can be seen as an effort to circumvent a basic problem, often 
called “Prichard’s dilemma”, that faces any theoretical attempt to shed light on the 
authority of morality.3 Such attempts cannot succeed by showing that there are 
non-moral reasons to be moral, since dutiful actions are not morally exemplary if 
they are chosen for non-moral (e.g. prudential) reasons. So it seems that the only 
choice is to show that there are moral reasons to be moral. Yet if the authority of 
moral reasons is in doubt, this would of course be viciously circular. The trick to 
circumventing Prichard’s dilemma is to locate moral demands in a broader circle 
of human concerns that are “far enough” from morality that they can genuinely 
illuminate its authority, even if that authority is in some doubt, yet “close enough” 
that their invocation does not improperly ground moral concern in some other, 
quite alien kind of reason. This is precisely what Darwall is trying to do by placing 
moral obligations in a circle of related concepts that illuminate the normative 
structure of second-personal relations. Yet Darwall operates with an extremely 
restrictive conception of the “right kind of reason” to be moral.4 As a result, he 
places moral duties in a circle of related concerns with too tight a circumference to 
cast fresh light either on their content or their importance. This is why his position 
seems at times to boil down to the unhelpful insistence that moral obligations are 
required because people can legitimately require that one perform them, and that 
one must act morally because other people can legitimately demand that one do so.  
We do of course have intuitions about what people can legitimately demand of 
us, and we of them. But we have these views because our entire lives have unfolded 
in human relations that go well beyond those of mutual responsibility and respect. It 
is from this wider context that we gain our sense of the value of human beings and 
human lives. If we could somehow think away this wider context, we would be left 
with a barren and wholly asocial landscape against which a voiced demand would 
                                                          
3. This dilemma was put forward by H. A. Prichard in “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” 
in Mind 21 (1912), 21-37. 
4. This, I think, is what induces Darwall to criticize Scanlon for seeking to illuminate the authority of 
moral reasons by invoking the intrinsic value of human relationships conditioned by mutual 
recognition or respect. Darwall regards this move as providing the wrong kind of reasons to be moral. 
I think it can persuasively be seen, instead, as a viable way to amplify our sense of the value of moral 
decency. (See Darwall, 2009, 36, 316-18.) 
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protrude as something absurd rather than as an urgent Darwallian summons. 
Suppose someone to be bitten by remorse for murdering a fellow human being. 
Does this consist only in a full reckoning with the fact that the victim had the 
authority to demand not to be killed, and that others have the authority to blame 
one for having done so? This is, roughly speaking, where the Darwallian circle of 
interrelated second-personal concepts runs out.  But it seems radically inadequate 
to the reckoning at hand. After all, others have similar authority to demand that we 
not turn our backs to them when we’ve just been introduced, yet there is a world of 
difference between rudeness and murder. Full remorse for murder is not simply a 
matter of seeing that the victim had the authority to demand not to be killed. It is a 
matter of seeing whatever it is about the victim that makes this particular 
requirement a solemn one. This is what I am gesturing towards with the term 
‘irreplaceability’. 
We can approach the same point by imagining someone who makes clear that 
he does not demand observance of even the most minimal moral limitations on our 
treatment of him. He will lodge no objection, make no contrary demand, if we speak 
to him in a humiliating way, subject him to pain, even torture him. Surely the 
obligation not to humiliate or torture this person would remain constant whether 
or not he is prepared to demand its observance. The obligation seems then to be 
grounded in his value, to which he is currently blind, and not in his authority to 
make demands.  It is highly implausible to suppose that we would be respecting 
him as a demand-maker by insisting, for his sake, upon a demand that he himself 
declines to make. 
Here we come face to face with two points that we’ve seen before. First the 
Kantian approach seems capable of affirming irreplaceable value at the level of 
substantive ethical claims only by importing this same irreplaceability as an 
independent ethical intuition. Second, the approach seems to provide an ill-fitting 
theoretical setting for this independent evaluative insight, for we do not doubt the 
irreplaceability of those human beings who are not themselves moved to demand 
its recognition, or who lack the capacity to make the demand. On the contrary, we 
often have particularly powerful apprehensions of irreplaceability when we come 
face to face with newborns or with adults whose illness or suffering has placed them 
beyond the reach of reasoned dialogue. 
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III. Irreplaplaceable Value, Respect and Love 
Now, the Kantian takes all moral demands to be expressions of mutual 
respect. Perhaps the root of the problems we’ve been considering is that 
recognition of the irreplaceable value of our fellow human beings lies beyond 
the scope of mere respect. That would certainly explain why Kantianism must 
import the affirmation of irreplaceability as an independent ethical intuition, 
and why it seems to offer an ill-fitting articulation of this imported intuition. 
In attempting to examine this suggestion, however, we run into a serious 
methodological difficulty. For we cannot explore the topic at hand unless we have 
a firm grip on what we are talking about when we say such things as that the loss of 
human life cannot be compensated without remainder. Yet while there are 
moments in almost any life that bring home the full resonance of such affirmations 
of irreplaceability, these moments are rare and often very painful, and the 
understanding achieved in them cannot dependably be reproduced in full 
whenever philosophical reflection happens to demand it. Nor can we bring our 
quarry into view by fixing upon a generic idea of irreplaceability, suitable for 
application not only to humans but also to pets or inanimate objects. For it seems 
possible to have a workable understanding of the irreplaceability of, say, an artifact 
or historic relic, yet still not grasp what people mean when they speak of the 
irreplaceable value of human beings. The term ‘irreplaceable’ seems to function like 
an attributive adjective, at least in the sense that its meaning depends partly on the 
kind to which it is applied. 
In wrestling with this methodological problem, we are hampered by the 
professional philosophical commitment to bloodlessly abstract jargon. This 
commitment often serves the laudable purpose of heading off sentimentality and 
its attendant illusions, but here it threatens to distance us from lucid apprehension 
of a genuine value in whose reality we have great confidence. It threatens to take 
what we know in the moment of birth as a near-miraculous advent, and in the 
moment of death as a yawning abyss of absence, and to shrink it to the unimposing 
dimensions of an anomaly in decision theory. I do not know of any string of words 
that can reliably induce appreciation of the irreplaceability of our fellow human 
beings. But if I had to suggest something, I might quote the last stanza of Auden’s 
“Funeral Blues”: 
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The stars are not wanted now: put out every one; 
Pack up the moon and dismantle the sun; 
Pour away the ocean and sweep up the wood. 
For nothing now can ever come to any good.5 
This is an expression of grief, not last respects. Respect – at least in the ordinary, 
non-technical sense –is entirely consistent with a lack of grief at the passing of the 
person who is its object. There is no tension in saying: I respected him, but I can’t 
say I’m sorry to see him go. Respect is properly called forth by awareness of the 
existence of another human being. It is one aspect of full acknowledgement of 
another. Kantians may be right that respect involves the recognition of powerful 
reasons to do what one can to prolong and enhance the lives of other human beings. 
But respect alone does not ground gladness for the existence of others, or grief at 
their loss. This suggests that it does not itself include an appreciation of the 
irreplaceable value of others. 
Here we can see a telling contrast between respect and love. Now love can take 
many forms, including at least the three forms distinguished with the Greek terms 
eros, philia, and agape. The lines between these kinds of love are fluid. A single 
relationship can involve all three. But we catch sight of one thing that unifies them 
as a coherent category when we consider that they all have an internal connection 
with grief. To the question “Why are you grieving,” a suitable answer is “I loved 
him” and the answer does not await clarification concerning what kind of love one 
had – whether erotic, intimately friendly, or neighborly. There is no grief without 
at least a modicum of love, and no love without a propensity for grief. Indeed, I 
believe that grief is the form taken by love when its object is (thought to be) 
extinguished. But if grief is a particularly vivid appreciation of the irreplaceable 
value of a human being, and if grief is just love in the context of loss, then 
presumably love consists at least in part in appreciation of irreplaceable value. 
I think this is basically right, but I have a terminological concern about this way 
of putting the matter. For if we take the term at face value, ‘irreplaceability’ is a 
relational property – the property, namely, of having no suitable replacement. The 
evaluative property that love brings into view, and that accounts for our grief at the 
                                                          
5. W. H. Auden, “Funeral Blues,” https://allpoetry.com/Funeral-Blues. 
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death of loved ones, does not seem to be similarly relational. It seems to be an 
intrinsic evaluative property that implies, but is not exhausted by, the absence of any 
adequate replacement. It would be nice to have another term for this more 
fundamental intrinsic property. Yet I’m not entirely happy with any of the terms that 
suggest themselves. Kant’s ‘dignity’ does not seem apt, partly because it has a well-
established philosophical use under which its full appreciation is respect, not love. 
The term ‘sacredness’ is unsuited for fully secular deployment, while ‘preciousness’ 
sounds affectedly delicate – in a word, precious. In the end, then, I think it best to 
leave the intrinsic property unnamed, and to speak of it through the lens of the 
relational property implied by it, since this keeps its ethical import in clear view. 
It might be thought that if love and grief really are apprehensions of the 
property under discussion, then that property must be relational in a different 
sense. For what surfaces in moments of grief might be thought to be irreplaceability 
to the person doing the grieving. Yet I do not think that the irreplaceability brought 
into view by grief is fundamentally person-relative. The irreparable gap in the life 
of the grieving person is a consequence of the irreplaceability of the person whose 
life once unfolded where that hole has suddenly appeared. The hole cannot possibly 
be filled because its former occupant admits of no substitute. I think we must take 
this view of the experience of irreplaceable loss on pain of assigning to grief a 
perversely self-directed content, making it ultimately about the griever rather than 
the deceased. 
This is no doubt a contestable point, so perhaps we should explore it a bit 
further. Suppose I am pondering the news that 30 are dead in an airport bombing 
in Brussels, or that a drone has sent a Hellfire missile into an Afghan wedding party. 
If am not fully awake to the significance of such news, as usually I am not, I cannot 
simply attain full appreciation at will. But there are ways to jog the mind. It does 
not help to remind myself that the victims were practical reasoners. For me, at least, 
that language does not open the way to a deeper and more illuminating 
appreciation of the wrongdoing and its stakes. But I can sometimes bring myself to 
lucidity by recalling that the victims were each somebody’s child and perhaps also 
somebody’s sibling, somebody’s lover, somebody’s spouse. The point is not to 
remind myself that in addition to the badness of the killing, there is also the anguish 
of the loved ones who are left behind. The point is to attain an especially lucid 
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apprehension of the utter irreplaceability of the freshly dead, because this is 
essential to comprehending the wrong that has been done to them. But if the 
grieving lover’s standpoint really can help us to appreciate the irreplaceable value 
of the dead, this value must not after all be indexed to the griever. It must be 
irreplaceability tout court. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that we must actually love everyone in order 
to sustain the idea of ourselves as having weighty duties to all human beings. 
Rather, I am suggesting that love reveals to us a dimension of the value of human 
beings that would be unknown to us without it and that is most clearly seen in its 
light, and further, that we could not understand of the urgency of our duties if this 
dimension of value were unknown to us. 
IV. Aristotelianism, Directed Duties, and Irreplaceability 
As noted at the outset, the return to Kantian ethics among late 20th Century 
philosophers was partly motivated by recoil from the moral mathematics of 
utilitarianism, and its readiness to picture losses of life and liberty as 
compensated without remainder by benefits to others. Interestingly, the essay 
widely credited with initiating the late 20th Century revival of Aristotelian 
ethics, Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosohy,” gives voice to just 
the same sort of complaint against utilitarianism. Anscombe goes so far as to 
say that philosophers show “a corrupt mind” insofar as they affirm the abstract 
utilitarian thesis that in certain kinds of cases it would be permissible, or 
perhaps even required, to treat innocent people unjustly in order to secure 
compensating benefits for others (Anscombe, 1958, 1-19, quotation, p. 17). 
If we think of Anscombe as an early proponent of what has come to be called 
virtue ethics, this claim might seem surprising. After all, contemporary 
Aristotelians who profess to take inspiration from Anscombe have had relatively 
little to say about the virtue of justice. Moreover, this omission is widely regarded 
as non-accidental, since many philosophers think that Aristotelianism cannot 
provide a compelling conception of justice, precisely because it cannot provide a 
proper conception of the moral importance of individual persons. The basic 
objection, which has been pressed by theorists as various as Sam Scheffler, 
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Nicholas Wolterstorff, Eric Mack, Gerald Gaus and Thomas Hurka,6 is that 
Aristotle and those inspired by him give the wrong kind of reason for other-
regarding moral norms. This, it is said, is because they must ultimately ground the 
badness of murder, rape, etc. in some associated setback to the well-being of the 
perpetrator rather than in harm or affront to the victim. 
This objection turns, I think, on a straightforwardly mistaken reading of 
Aristotle. Eudaimonia is lifelong activity in accordance with and arising from good 
reasoning. It is not the ground of the reasons recognized by those who achieve it. It 
is, I believe and have argued elsewhere, an anachronistic distortion to categorize 
the reasons we act upon when we live an eudaimon life as prudential, or even as 
self-referential (Brewer, 2009, Chs. 6 and 7). When we display courage on the 
battlefield, we are acting in order to defend the city, not in order to enhance our 
well-being. Similarly, when we act in ways that express the virtue of justice, our aim 
is to give another his due, not to make our own lives go better. It is true that our 
lives would go badly if we chose not to act courageously or justly, but this is because 
we would thereby be failing to do what we have reason to do, and our flourishing 
requires that we manage our lives in light of the verdicts of a well-functioning and 
therefore truth-tracking faculty of practical reason. Avoiding this setback in 
eudaimonia is not a self-standing reason to do it. Indeed, it would be self-defeating 
to do it solely for this reason, since the resulting action would not qualify as a 
constituent of the lifelong activity that Aristotle calls eudaimonia. The phronimos 
consistently chooses the eudaimon life, but not under that description. 
Thus far, courageous and just actions are on the same footing: neither is 
performed for prudential reasons. Why think, in addition, that Aristotle construes 
just actions as something we owe it to particular others to do? Aristotle makes clear 
that an unjust act is always unjust to some particular person, and that no one can 
be done an injustice except by someone’s unjust act. Justice, then, seems to be a 
sphere where every wrong action wrongs some particular, identifiable person. 
Further, as Michael Thompson has helpfully pointed out, the Greek virtue of justice 
takes its name (dikaiosune) and much of its character from the legal term ‘dike’, 
most commonly used to denote private suits that could only be raised by the 
                                                          
6. For references to the relevant works, see footnote no. 7 of Mark LeBar, “Virtue Ethics and Deontic 
Constraints,” Ethics 119, No. 4 (2009), 642-71. 
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aggrieved party of his representatives. Such suits were understood by contrast with 
public suits (graphe) which could be brought by any citizen. If we lean some weight 
on this etymological connection, perhaps we can say that the Aristotelian virtue of 
dikaiosune is the virtue of treating others in just those ways that they can 
legitimately demand to be treated (See Thompson, 2004, 333-384; especially 
345).7 We can say, in other words, that it is a practically efficacious sensitivity to a 
certain range of what Darwall would call second-personal reasons. 
If this reading of Aristotle is right, and if he is a paradigmatic eudaimonist, then 
it seems that eudaimonism can after all accommodate the thought that some ethical 
demands are dyadic or directional, in the sense that failing to heed them is not only 
wrong but wrongs some particular person. But the question remains whether the 
Aristotelian is in a position to offer a compelling account of the sort of value that 
human beings have, such that they should figure in our practical thought in this way.  
I’ve suggested that Kantianism owes its appeal in large part to its substantive 
recognition of the irreplaceable value of every human being. I’ve also suggested that 
view of the value of human beings is internal to love. There is, as it happens, a well-
known thinker who incorporates into the virtue of love into an otherwise largely 
Aristotelian picture of virtuous character. That thinker is, of course, Thomas 
Aquinas. (It bears mention that Anscombe herself was heavily influenced by 
Aquinas, though she reportedly made it a practice not to mention that certain of 
her ideas came from this source because she thought this would discourage other 
philosophers from taking these ideas seriously.8) The virtue of love is the key to 
Aquinas’s doctrine of the unity of the virtues: without it, no virtue can be perfect, 
and it implies the perfection of all other virtues (Aquinas, 1948, I, II, Q 62, A 4 and 
II, II, Q 23, A 8). In this respect, love plays the role in Aquinas that practical wisdom 
plays in Aristotle. Love “quickens” and refines the other virtues, bringing them to 
their proper perfection. It does this by informing them with vivid awareness of the 
end that gives them their point (Aquinas, 1948, II, II, Q 23, A 8). 
Now, for Aquinas this ultimate end is God, and our happiness consists in 
contemplative appreciation (which is to say, active love) of this end. But each 
                                                          
7. See also http://www.stoa.org/projects/demos/article_law_glossary?page=all. 
8. Candace Vogler, “Aristotle, Aquinas, Anscombe and the New Virtue Ethics,” at: 
https://www.academia.edu/2500806/Aristotle_Aquinas_Anscombe_and_the_New_Virtue_Ethics 
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human being bears a likeness to this ultimate end, and is therefore also a proper 
object of love. When the virtues are “quickened” by love, all human beings show 
forth as bearers of a special sort of value, and objects of a special sort of concern. If 
I am right about the internal connection between love and irreplaceability, then this 
must mean, at least, that they show forth as irreplaceable. 
I think that there is a kernel of insight in Aquinas’s view of the virtue of love, 
and that it can be incorporated into a secular virtue ethics. To see this, we might 
begin by noting that love seems in certain respects to be well suited for the role of 
perfecting and unifying the (other) virtues. This is so, in the first instance, because 
it has a perfectionist structure, and that which lights up the evaluative stakes of, and 
proper practical response to, all possible circumstances does not itself lie in a mean 
between extremes, but must be a perfection. Second, it is a perfection of the right 
sort to count as a virtue, since it is a motivating apprehension of value. Third, it has 
the right reach to perfect all other virtues, since it provides a sweeping and general 
picture of the values to which we ought to be responsive. 
We can see more clearly how love “quickens” the evaluative perception given by 
other virtues by building on the connection we’ve discerned between love and 
irreplaceability. It does not take love, or any special evaluative insight associated 
with love, to grasp the bare fact that another is suffering. However, one cannot fully 
understand the badness of another’s suffering unless one’s apprehension of that 
suffering is “quickened” by awareness of that other’s irreplaceable value. After all, 
suffering borrows its significance in large part from the value of the life it mars, and 
there is nothing essentially tragic in the marring of a life if that life lacks 
irreplaceable value. Suffering of this sort can be compensated without remainder 
by the good fortune or happiness of another. If our apprehension of suffering is 
conditioned, even implicitly, by the idea of its openness to such trans-personal 
compensation, we fail to grasp its stakes.  
This point generalizes to whatever makes the lives of human beings go well or 
badly. To take a few examples, one cannot see romantic loves or family bonds as 
running deep, or as carrying the significance one is likely to attach to one’s own 
loves and family bonds, unless one credits these romantic loves and family bonds 
as mutual non-delusory apprehensions of a kind of value whose loss cannot be 
compensated. Nor can one see another’s experience of oppression or persecution 
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as a genuine experience of the intolerable thing we know the oppression and 
persecution of human beings to be, unless one sees in their subjugation and 
persecution the threat of the tragic withering of something (e.g. a life, or an array of 
personal projects and relationships) whose loss cannot be made good by gains 
registered by others. And if one cannot see others’ loves and sufferings as deep or 
potentially tragic, then one cannot hear their words as giving witness to real love or 
real suffering, nor see in their facial expressions or gestures or art or music the signs 
of the sort of emotions with which one credits oneself, the sort that run deep.9 
The virtues all involve sensitivity and responsiveness to those things that make 
human lives go well or badly, and a proper grasp of the value of any such thing must 
be limned by awareness of the kind of value possessed by the life it conditions. For 
this reason love, which brings with it an awareness of the irreplaceable value of 
human beings and their lives, can enliven and refine the evaluative sensitivity 
associated with any virtue. 
It might be thought that love of the sort I’ve been discussing cannot give us a 
grasp of the irreplaceability of each and every human being, since those people who 
are truly evil are not fitting objects of love. This is a tempting view, but I think it is 
mistaken. A liminal awareness of irreplaceability is essential even to a full 
appreciation of evil. Without this background awareness, we cannot appreciate the 
stakes of serious vice, among which must be counted the irreplaceable loss of the 
chance to live well. This is what is properly grieved in the case of an evil person, and 
in extreme cases grief might even be appropriate before death, though perhaps it 
must always be conditioned by some measure of hope (even if only for a glimmer 
of remorse). 
As has perhaps become clear by now, I favor a McDowellian “no priority” view 
of the relationship between the attitude of love and the property of 
irreplaceability.10 That is, I think that the attitude and the property move together, 
and neither can be explained without reference to the other. A full explanation of 
the attitude of love will have to mention that it brings irreplaceability into view, and 
                                                          
9. Here I am borrowing amply from Raimond Gaita’s work on the recognition of our common 
humanity (See for instance Gaita, 2003, pp. 261-77, especially p. 267 and 273; See also Gaita, 1991 
and 2004, pp. xiii & xxiii).  
10. For more on this sort of view, see McDowell, 1998, Chapters 7 & 8. 
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a full explanation of the relevant notion of irreplaceability will require reference to 
how things seem when we love. Those who have experienced love can bring the 
evaluative property to mind by talk of irreplaceability. But absent some experience 
with love, this word would not be sufficient to convey the property in question, even 
to someone who had a grasp of the irreplaceable value of something other than a 
human being. 
I’ve tried to show that viewing another as irreplaceably valuable involves a kind 
of gestalt shift – that is, a comprehensive yet subtle alteration in the way one hears 
another’s words, interprets her actions and emotions, understands her 
relationships, and sees her gestures and facial expressions. Here we catch sight of 
an important feature of moral value, a feature that might be called its 
unlocalizability. Recognition of this sort of value undergirds our capacity to grieve 
the loss of our friends, to have the deepest sort of conversation with people in full 
trust that their words and sentiments run deep, to read literature with the sort of 
trust in the author’s sensibility that permits us to find solace and inspiration in her 
work, and so forth. 
Moral value, then, is not a special and isolated kind of value, relevant only to the 
formulation and vindication of a range of interpersonal demands or obligations. This 
suggests that philosophical inquiry into the foundations of morality won’t get very 
far if they are conducted in isolation from broader reflection about the human good. 
But it simultaneously suggests a different vision of fruitful philosophical reflection on 
morality. For the irreplaceable value of human beings, which gives weight and 
urgency to moral duties, might be clarified by fully explicating the value of many of 
our most important interactions with other people, ranging from our intimate loves 
and friendships, to our appreciation of the literature and music of others, to our 
deepest and most valuable conversations. We might sensibly hope to bolster our 
confidence in the importance of moral duties by exploring these interactions. It 
would not be morally objectionable to be moved to honor various moral “thou shalt 
nots” by appreciation of this ubiquitous value, as for instance it would be 
objectionable to be moved by a sense of self-interest. This provides one way of 
thinking about the nature and point of (modern) eudaimonism in ethical theory. It 
is a strategy for navigating Prichard’s dilemma, grounded in the thought that one can 
range very far afield from central cases of moral duty without changing the subject. 
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V. Love and Its Place in Ethics 
It might be objected that I’ve mistakenly attempted to inform an ethical 
universalism with a kind of love that cannot by its nature be universal in reach. 
Put another way, I’ve focused on a picture of value internal to philia or eros, 
but not to agape, yet only this last sort of love can serve as the basis for a 
properly inclusive and impartial ethical theory. Further, it might be charged, 
an ethics based on agape would be utilitarian, not Kantian or Aristotelian, for 
agape involves a motivation to further the well-being of all human beings, and 
this is just what utilitarianism requires. 
If universal benevolence understood along utilitarian lines really were a form of 
love, the charge at hand would be a powerful one. But I do not think this is a plausible 
view, for it can make no sense of our reluctance to regard unbridled egoism as a 
variant of the same relation we have to others when we love them. It is, after all, 
deeply implausible to suppose that a purely egoistic person already has first-hand 
acquaintance with love, and can grasp the nature of the love relationships that non-
egoists regard as more valuable by simple substitution of variables. 
As I see it, talk of self-love is misleading in something like the way that talk of 
asking oneself something, or informing oneself, is misleading. We do of course use 
these forms of speech, but the meaning of the relevant verbs shifts subtly in the 
reflexive case. As Matthias Haase has persuasively argued, to ask oneself something 
is not to seek to be informed of the answer but to wonder what the answer might 
be, and to inform oneself of something is not to impart knowledge to oneself but to 
take steps to acquire it. To quote Haase, “If I do not know, then I am not the one to 
ask. And if I do, there is no point in telling me” (Haase, 2014, p. 5). The verb ‘love’ 
also subtly shifts its meaning in the intrapersonal case, and for the same reason: 
strictly speaking there is no second person to encounter here. Self-love is not 
genuine love because genuine love is an encounter with a separate person who leads 
a separate life and can offer a distinct vantage point on the world – someone who 
can disagree with us and hence can meaningfully agree with us, someone whose 
considered views can take us wholly by surprise. Only someone with this sort of 
separateness can provide the kind of accompaniment that we know and value 
under the term ‘love’. 
In the Symposium, Socrates elaborates a view of love that he credits to the 
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mystic Diotima, according to which interpersonal love (eros) consists in a longing 
to beget what is good in the medium of another’s soul (Plato, 1994, 206C-209E). 
Aristotle takes a somewhat similar view in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he 
claims that love (philia) “to the full extent”(Aristotle, 1985, 1157a32) occurs when 
two people are drawn together by appreciation of the good in each, and who are in 
a position to contribute to, and enhance, each other’s goodness (Aristotle, 1985, 
1155a12-16; 1170a11-12; 1172a10-14). These sources provide a picture of 
interpersonal love as an active appreciation of, and commitment to, the emerging 
potentiality for goodness in the life of another human being. Yet Diotima and 
Aristotle differ in their conception of the detachability of this appreciation of 
goodness from the human beings who occasion it. For Diotima, appreciation of the 
good present in particular humans can eventually give way to a more direct 
appreciation of the good, detached from its worldly instantiations (Plato, 1994, 
210A-212B), while for Aristotle our most revealing apprehensions of the human 
good are immanent, and take the form of an appreciation of the particular path of 
emergence towards the good that organizes and lends intelligibility to this or that 
human life. It is this latter, Aristotelian sort of love that, in my view, provides us 
with whatever grip we have on the irreplaceable value of human beings. And while 
it is of course true that this love cannot be universalized, since we cannot know 
everyone well, it is suited to enrich our understanding of what is at stake in each 
human life, and why the lives of our kind have a value that does not admit of 
substitution. 
Love dissolves into egoistic aloneness if others are not apprehended as equally 
real and equally valuable, but it dissolves into what might be called “utilitarian 
aloneness” if what is recognized as equally real and equally valuable is not, at the 
end of the day, truly other. It is only in this latter case that it will seem tempting to 
accept the implicit utilitarian view that the difference between persons is no more 
significant, for purposes of practical deliberation, than the difference between time-
slices of a single life. Between the aloneness of egoism and the aloneness of 
overzealous utilitarian inclusiveness is the Aristotelian conception of philia as 
encounter with “another oneself” – an awkward phrase, no doubt, but one that 
marks rather than evades the inner tensions and potential pitfalls of interpersonal 
love. Both words need to be emphasized to hear what this phrase says. Another 
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oneself, like to this one, but not this one, rather, another oneself. 
What keeps us from fully apprehending the reality of others is not ignorance. 
There is no proposition that we do not know, such that we could clear things up by 
providing a convincing argument for its truth. Even in the most favored cases – say, 
of long-time lovers, lying next to each other in bed – the sudden full 
acknowledgment of the presence of a fellow traveler from cradle to grave, right 
there on the next pillow, can sometimes arise with percussive force. If love quickens 
and completes the virtues, we should not expect the completion and quickening of 
the virtues to be more than an intermittent and imperfect achievement. We are 
often consigned to plodding along in the darkness, guided by dim memory of how 
the value of our fellow beings seems when our vision is sharper, and holding 
ourselves mechanically to a few urgent “thou shalt nots.” Yet if I’m right, the most 
convincing of our substantive ethical theories are animated by a conception of value 
that we attain to only in these intermittent and imperfect moments of clarity, and 
the clearest of these moments are moments of love.  
Conclusion  
I have tried to show that Kantianism cannot provide an independent rational 
vindication, or even a fully illuminating articulation, of the irreplaceable value 
of our fellow human beings, and have sketched a virtue-theoretic ethical 
theory that can do better in this regard. The theory in question borrows from 
Aquinas the thought that love is the keystone of the virtues, unifying and 
perfecting the other virtues, and attempts to show that love essentially 
involves a vivid apprehension of irreplaceable value.  The hope is to have 
outlined a strategy for overcoming two widespread and fundamental 
criticisms of virtue-theoretic approaches to ethical theory: (1) that such 
approaches cannot make good sense of the value of other human beings; and 
(2) that such approaches cannot make good sense of duties whose fulfillment 
is owed to, and hence can be demanded by, other human beings. 
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